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RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Friel failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by imposing
a unified sentence of 14 years, with six years fixed, upon a jury’s verdict finding him guilty of
grand theft, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence?

Friel Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A jury found Friel guilty of grand theft, and the district court imposed a unified sentence
of 14 years, with six years fixed. (R., pp.210-14.) Friel filed a timely Rule 35 motion for
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reconsideration of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.215-22.) Friel filed a notice
of appeal, timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.223-26.)
Friel asserts his sentence is excessive in light of the nature of the offense, his substance
abuse issues, his character, and his claim that that the sentence “was not necessary to protect the
public interest.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
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prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for grand theft is 14 years. I.C. § 18-2408 (2)(a). The
district court imposed a unified sentence of 14 years, with six years fixed, which falls within the
statutory guidelines. (R., pp.210-14.) On appeal, Friel contends that his sentence was not
reasonable because of the nature of the offense, his character, and his claim that the sentence
“was not necessary to protect the public interest.” (Appellant’s brief, p.3.) Friel’s criminal
history and his continued criminal thinking demonstrate the reasonableness of his sentence.
Friel has an extensive criminal history that includes four prior felony convictions for theft
by receiving/possessing stolen property, battery on a correctional officer, and two counts of
burglary.

(PSI, pp.15-16. 1)

His record also includes two additional felony charges, 14

misdemeanor charges, and 27 misdemeanor convictions for assault, loitering, minor in
possession, negligent driving, disturbing the peace (amended from battery), no contact order
violation, two counts of theft by receiving, two counts of battery, three counts of resisting, three
counts of use/possess drug paraphernalia, three counts of false information, and eight counts of
petit theft. (PSI, pp.12-20.) Additionally, at the time of sentencing, Friel had three pending
felony charges for burglary and two counts of receiving, possessing, or disposing of stolen
property. (PSI, pp.19-20.) Friel has been placed on probation, has had the benefit of retained
jurisdiction programming, and has served prison time for his crimes. (PSI, pp.12-20.) None of
these prior legal sanctions and rehabilitative opportunities has had any deterrent or rehabilitative
effect, however, as demonstrated by Friel’s conduct in this case: Friel entered a Wal-Mart store,
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Supreme Court No.
45612 Michael Paul Friel – Confidential Exhibits.pdf.”
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put a total of $1,243.70 worth of merchandise a cart, and then left the store without paying for
the items. (PSI, p.11.)
Friel claims that his character and substance abuse issues warrant a lesser term of
incarceration. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) Friel, however, has repeatedly demonstrated that his
character is that of someone either unwilling or unable to comply with the law, even in the
confines of a correctional facility. While in IDOC custody, Friel amassed 38 disciplinary actions
that included possession of homemade alcohol, flooding his cell on numerous occasions, refusing
to return to his cell, fondling his penis in front of staff, making disrespectful comments to staff,
throwing urine on an officer, verbally threatening officers, and destroying state property. (PSI,
pp.20-21.) Additionally, while on a retained jurisdiction program, Friel threatened to stab and
hang another inmate. (PSI, p.21.) Friel’s violent actions continued when, while incarcerated in
the Jerome County jail, he attempted to steal another inmate’s property and, in the ensuing
altercation, punched the other inmate and broke his nose. (PSI, p.21.) Friel’s character supports,
not militates against, the sentence imposed.
Friel’s substance abuse issues are also not particularly mitigating. Although Friel selfreported a long history of untreated alcohol and illegal substance abuse, it appears he has taken
no steps to seek treatment for his addictions. (PSI, pp.25-26.) He reported that he had been
using methamphetamine daily and heroin weekly, and mixing the two together. (PSI, p.33.) He
also reported that he overdosed on October 31, 2016, but continued to use methamphetamine
after his overdose. (PSI, p.33.) Friel admitted to continuing to use methamphetamine even
while acknowledging that it has interfered with every aspect of his life, and that his use has put
him in dangerous situations. (PSI, p.35.) While Friel is clearly in need of substance abuse
treatment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, in light of Friel’s extensive

4

criminal history, that any such treatment would be best provided in a correctional, as opposed to
a drug-court and/or probation-type, setting.
At sentencing, the district court addressed Friel’s extensive criminal record, his abysmal
performance while previously incarcerated, his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite
multiple prior legal sanctions, and the need to protect the community from his criminal behavior.
(10/26/17 Tr., p.21, L.21 – p.26, L.16.) The district court articulated the correct legal standards
applicable to its decision and concluded:
I read your account of what happened in the PSI. There’s a definite lack
of accountability. I was out helping a couple of other friends. I consider the
inconsistencies in the representations that were made to the psychological
evaluator as well as the PSI evaluator. I listened to the statements that you made
regarding while you were incarcerated to your wife or your significant other, as
well as to a relative and it’s just making light of it.
So I hear what you’re saying to me, but your actions don’t – they’re not
consistent with what you’re saying to me. I don’t think that you really are willing
to change.
(10/26/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.4-16.) The state submits that Friel has failed to establish an abuse of
discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing
transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.
Friel next asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion
for a reduction of sentence in light of a letter a former prisoner submitted on his behalf.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.) If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of
the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840
(2007). To prevail on appeal, Friel must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35
motion.” Id. Friel has failed to satisfy his burden.
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Friel provided no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion that showed his
sentence was excessive.

Information with respect to Friel’s prior criminal history, his

willingness to change, and that the monetary amount he was convicted of shoplifting was just “a
few hundred dollars above the misdemeanor cut off level of $1000” was before the district court
at the time of sentencing; as such, none of this was “new” information. (R., p.216; PSI, pp.1120, 26.) The letter of support in which a former prisoner/parolee offered to assist Friel and stated
he would “kn[e]w for a fact that [Friel] will make it” was likewise not “new” information that
supported a reduction of sentence. (See R., pp.218-19.) The district court agreed and concluded,
“Without new information or further reasoning as to why the sentence should be reduced, the
defendant has not carried his burden to show that his sentence was excessive, unduly severe,
and/or unreasonable.” (R., p.221.) Because Friel presented no new evidence in support of his
Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive. Having
failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district
court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Friel’s conviction and sentence and
the district court’s order denying Friel’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
DATED this 10th day of August, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of August, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.
__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

1

on probation.

2

We have the additional argument in this

1

open and the other things he has in place with work and

2

things he's asking the Court to consider drug court
today.

3

case that the Court would have very close control over

3

4

Mr. Friel and be able to see very quickly if he was

4

5 · relapsing and if he was going to be a danger to the

5

I'm just making sure I covered every1hing I
wanted to cover, Your Honor.

6

community and to inventory loss at stores in the area.

6

7
8

Most people aren't going to say, look, all

7

probation if the Court does choose his recommendation

he got was 11-plus months and so I'm going to try to

8

today, Your Honor, and that would be his request.

9

push some stuff out of Walmart too. There's still a

9

1O deterrent factor there because he's done a lot of jail.

So he has filled out the conditions of

Thank you.

10

TH E COURT: Thank you.

11

One of the biggest deterrent factors will be a

11

12

substantial sentence hanging over his head that the

12

13

Court can impose if he doesn't do what he's saying here

13

14

today, which would be to follow through.

14

I've got a long past, a long history, and I understand

15

that. I mean, I've been a screw-up most of my life.

15

He's done. You know. he's 40 years old now

Mr. Friel, you have the right to address
the Court. Anything you would like to say?
THE DEFENDANT: I have been, you know, Your Honor

16

he tells me. He doesn't want to be the way he's been

16

Like Ben said, I have been in and out of jail; I've had

17

in the past. He looks at himself and says this is not

17

my ups and downs with drugs. My prison sentence was

18

good.

18

the same way.

19

He wouldn't object, if the Court says this

19

I do feel for everything that I've took

20

record is too much, I can't do this, he would ask the

20

from the community and the people that took their time

21

Court to consider retaining jurisdiction if the Court

21

out to handle my case, the lady at Walmart taking her

22
23
24
25

comes to that conclusion and then order drug court upon

22
23
24
25

his return.
But, fi rst and foremost, I think with this
window open riow for drug court and the halfway house

time away from what she could be doing, the commun ity
and the tax payers for me being in here.
There's a -- I got an opportunity to get
help. I got an opportunity to do a program that will

20

19

1

help me better myself. By bettering myself, I'll become

1

2

a better part of the community. I'm tired of living

2

3

this. I'm tired. I'm just tired of it. I'm tired of

3

4

all the trouble that comes w ith it. I'm tired of all

4

probation or some form of incarceration is appropriate.

5

the heartache, everything.

5

In that regard, the Court considers the character of the

When I came in and I d id my drug -- for drug

6

society is the primary concern.
The Court also considers the factors set
forth in Idaho Code Section 19-252 1 to determine whether

6

offender, the nature of the underlying offense, as well

7

court, my interview for drug court, I was asked why do

7

as the defendant's prior record.

8

you want to do drug court? Because I want to be done.

8

9

I want to be done with it all. I got an opportunity to

9

10

do that.

11

The Court has reviewed the presentence
investigation report, along with the psychological

1O evaluati on and the materials submitted by the defense.
I got a little girl out there now that I

11

particularly the letter from Ken at New Hope and the

12

didn't fi nd out about until two weeks before I came in.

12

letter regarding defendant's employment. The Court

13

I grew up w ithout my dad and I don't want that to happen

13

also understands that Mr. Friel was found to be eligible

14

with her. I don't want, you know, I just don't want it

14

for drug court.

15

no more.

15
All I ask is that you give me or let me

16

However, w ith that being said and in the

16

Court's discretion, the Court does not feel , or finds
that based on Mr. Friel's criminal background - and

17

have the opportunity to do the program. Let me have.

17

18

the opportunity to prove not only to you and to society

18

I'll get into that in more detail -- that you're not a

19

that I can do better but to myself.

19

suitable candidate for probation. Probation would not

20

achieve its intended purpose. and also I think it would

20

That's all I've got.

21

THE COURT : Okay. Thank you.

22
23
24
25

All right, then. For purposes of sentencing
the Court considers the four goals of sentencing:
protection of society, rehabilitation. retribution, and
deterrence; recognizing, however, that protection of

21

depreciate the seriousness of the offense, particularly

22
23
24
25

based on your extensive criminal history.
Of note to me is a couple of things. You've
spent two terms w ith Idaho State Corrections. You
topped out because you violated parole. Also,

21
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1 jurisdiction was relinquished while you were doing a
2 rider. You would think after 2013 when you got released
3 that maybe the criminal justice system would have got
4 your attention, but you look at your criminal history
5 and there's extensive criminal history that occurred
6 after you were released. Clearly, you didn't get the
7 message. Clearly, whatever programming that IDOC
8 attempted to give you didn't stick.
9
Then you look at the disciplinary reports
10 that you received while you were incarcerated. That's
11 significant to me with respect to the fact that I think
12 your conduct is not just attributable to substance
13 abuse, and I'm getting that in terms of drug court,
14 it's your lack of respect for authority, your lack of
15 respect for the criminal j ustice system.
16
Part of the problem, when you're in the
17 drug court environment, you 've got to follow a lot of
18 rules. You've got to respect the drug court team. And
19 somebody that has a history of unwillingness to follow
20 the ru les, and I look at your horrible behavior while
21 you were in prison over those disciplinary reports, I
22 could see what would happen in drug court. I preside
23 over the drug court.
24
When we make a determination, when the team
25 makes a determination as to eligibility, you know, the
23
accountability and whether or not somebody is willing
to take responsibility for their actions and then
3 expresses a willingness to change.
4
I read your account of what happened in the
5 PSI. There's a definite lack of accountability. I was
6 out helping a couple of other friends. I consider the
7 inconsistencies in the representations that were made
8 to the psychological evaluator as well as the PSI
9 evaluator. I listened to the statements that you made
1O regarding while you were incarcerated to your wife or
11 your significant other, as well as to a relative and
12 it's just making light of it.
13
So I hear what you're saying to me, but
14 your actions don't-- they're not consistent with what
15 you're saying to me. I don't think that you really are
16 willing to change. I think you've been through the
17 system long enough. You got out. Again, you have this
18 extensive criminal history since you got out. So you're
19 not-- I find you're not an acceptable candidate for
20 probation, even drug court.
21
So that leaves me with what are the Court's
22 other options? Well, you've been through -- you've
23 been twice before with IDOC. You've had the rider. You
24 didn't do well on the rider.
25
So I think under the facts and circumstances
25

1
2
3

4

5
6

7
8

9

10
11
12

13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

1

1

2

2

3
4
5

6
7
8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

threshold requirements are the GAIN and the LSI, and
you did qualify. The team did not have the benefit of
your full criminal background and criminal history. And
had the team had that information, even though you did
qualify, they probably would have not agreed to accept
you. I would not have agreed to accept you.
Once we accept somebody like that, you're
working in close quarters with other participants, and
somebody that's not willing to follow the rules or that
has a lack of accountability tends to have an adverse
effect on the rest of the participants. And that's one
thing that we definitely try to avoid.
Again, based on your conduct while you were
incarcerated, had I known that, I would not have signed
that order stating that you were eligible for drug
court.
Also, another thing that we look at when
we're determining whether or not to allow somebody into
drug court is accountability. It's the exception, not
the rule, that somebody that goes to trial gets into
drug court. Typical circumstance is somebody that has
accepted responsibility for their actions.
Now I'm not saying going to trial gives you
a worse sentence than had you plead. That's not what
I'm saying. What I'm saying though is looking at
24
of your case, here is what I'm going to do. In the
exercise of discretion and for the reasons that I've
just stated, to the charge of grand theft, I'll impose
a sentence of court costs. I will impose a $1,500 fine.
I will impose penitentiary time, a unified sentence of
14 years, comprised of six years fixed, eight years
indeterminate. I will give you credit for time served.
I will have this sentence run concurrently with the
sentence imposed in Minidoka Case 2016-2555.
I will have the judgment prepared today.
You'll have 42 days from the file stamp within which to
appeal. I have to advise you if you cannot afford the
cost of an appeal, you may proceed in forma pauperis.
There's no bail to be exonerated in this
case. So I will remand your custody to the sheriff to
serve your sentence.
MR. WILLMORE: Your Honor, briefly, and I
apologize, and that's because I mixed up my notes with
what we discussed with Judge Brody because that hearing
actually went on halfway through the hearing until
Judge Brody recused himself, but we had discussed
restitution in that hearing. We have prepared an order
of$1,243.70. I think that's been filed.
THE COURT: And I should have brought up
restitution. Have you seen the order?
26
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